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Abstract
Background: Understanding social interactions requires the ability to accurately interpret conspecifics’ actions, sometimes
only on the basis of subtle body language analysis. Here we address an important issue that has not yet received much
attention in social neuroscience, that of an interaction between two agents. We attempted to isolate brain responses to two
individuals interacting compared to two individuals acting independently.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We used minimalistic point-light displays to depict the characters, as they provide the
most straightforward way to isolate mechanisms used to extract information from motion per se without any interference
with other visual information. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) method was used to determine which brain
regions were recruited during the observation of two interacting agents, mimicking everyday social scenes. While the mirror
and mentalizing networks are rarely concurrently active, we found that both of them might be needed to catch the social
intentions carried by whole-body motion.
Conclusions/Significance: These findings shed light on how motor cognition contributes to social cognition when social
information is embedded in whole-body motion only. Finally, the approach described here provides a valuable and original
tool for investigating the brain networks responsible for social understanding, in particular in psychiatric disorders.
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Introduction
Non-verbal communication participates considerably to our
understanding of social situations. Gaze direction, facial expressions,
gesture and posture, all provide relevant cues that are part of body
language [1]. Among these components, it is striking how much
information whole-body movements can carry in terms of their social
content: subtle differences in the kinematics of an index finger raised
up can result in completely different interpretations, from showing an
object to kicking someone out of a room. The present study aims at
delineating the brain regions participating in the understanding of
social intentions carried by body language only. Agent’s social
intentions were defined as intentions to act on conspecifics, who,
unlike inanimate targets of action, can act back [2].
In the seventies, Johansson defined a new and original method
to study human movement features, using point-lights [3]. As such,
the term ‘‘biological motion’’ refers to movements of humans (or
animals) displayed by point-lights solely. This enables to extract
information from motion per se without any interference from other
visual cues. Human motion provides important information about
the meaning of actions [4], the gender and identity of the
characters [5–8], and their emotional states [9–12].
Perception of whole-body point-light displays specifically
involves the posterior part of the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)
[13–15]. Interestingly, it also triggers activities in the action
observation/execution matching network which is activated both
when an action is observed and performed [16]. This network
consists of the premotor cortices (PM) [17,18], the inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG) [19], and parietal regions [20,21]. As these regions
contain mirror neurons [16,22], this network is referred to as the
mirror system. This system might be the neural substrate of the
motor simulation theory (i.e., the motor resonance) [23,24].
According to this theory, people understand the goal of other
people’s actions by simulating these actions with their own motor
programs [23,25–28]. When it comes to social interactions, the
observer needs to understand the intentions carried by two
persons, challenging the ability to simultaneously match both
actions onto his own motor repertoire [2]. So far, whether motor
simulation contributes to understanding the social intentions
generated by two interacting persons has still not been clearly
demonstrated [2,29,30].
The ability to process any information which leads to the
perception of a social feature is subserved by a set of brain regions
also defined as the social brain [31]. Among these structures, the
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parietal junction (TPJ), the anterior superior temporal sulci (aSTS)
and the amygdala play a major role [32–35]. Some of them are
thought to be devoted to mentalizing processes, but the findings
are heterogeneous and implicate an anatomically broad set of
regions [36].
The major objective of the present study was to clarify the
contribution of several key brain areas to the understanding of
everyday social interactions perceived through whole-body human
motion. Specifically, we hypothesized that the activity of the
mirror system would be enhanced by the presence of a social
interaction, because it requires understanding the actions and
intentions of two agents at the same time, therefore presenting
with a greater complexity of action understanding. Functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was carried out while subjects
were observing point-light displays in which two agents performed
together everyday social scenes or moved independently without
interacting. Two situations were compared in which two agents
were either interacting together (the social interaction condition,
SI) or moving separately without expressing any social intention
(the no social interaction condition, NSI).
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Fourteen healthy adult subjects (six females and eight males,
mean age 29.467.4 years) took part in this study. All the subjects
had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and no significant
history of medical, psychiatric or neurological illness. All
participants gave their written informed consent prior to
participating in the study, which was approved by the local ethics
committee (Comite ´ de Protection des Personnes Sud Me ´diterrane ´e
1).
Stimuli
Three-second silent point-light displays were created by
videotaping two different professional actors (2 females). The
displacement of twenty markers (15 mm in diameter) taped onto
the actors’ bodies was recorded with the SMART automatic
motion analyzer (BTS) at 120 Hz. This resulted in each actor
being depicted by twenty white dots (top of the head, neck,
shoulders, elbows, wrists, hands, thoracic and sacral vertebra, hips,
knees, ankles, little toes), moving against a black background.
The two actors were either interacting together (SI) (Fig. 1A,
Videos S1, S2, S3) or moving side by side without interacting (NSI)
(Fig. 1B, Videos S4, S5, S6). SI consisted in a dynamic sequence in
which one of the actor performed an action which triggered a
reaction from the other actor, resulting in a meaningful social
scene. The aim was to portray ecological, lifelike everyday social
scenes. A large range of SI displays were therefore used to cover
social scenes under the heading of social norms (conventional
gestures and courteous attitudes), emotional situations (carrying
positive or negative valences) and scenes from games (sports,
dance, etc.). Note that objects (such as a balloon, sword and chair)
were sometimes used but not visible. Twenty social screenplays as
defined above were played by the actors. Each original screenplay
was played twice since each of the actor initiated the social
interaction in turn. In the second condition (NSI), the two same
actors performed non goal-directed movements without interact-
ing. These movements included raising an arm or a leg, rotating
the trunk, bending forward or sideways, stepping forward or
backward, jumping, and other movements with no social
connotations. The two actors were filmed separately before being
pasted side by side in the NSI scene in order to prevent any
synchronization of movements which might have induced the
perception of social exchanges between the two characters [37].
Stimuli used for SI and NSI conditions were matched for overall
motion speed and actors’ types of movements as closely as possible.
We also used two different viewpoints when capturing the
original movies in order to vary the observer’s viewpoint. In the SI
scenes, the two agents were either face-to-face or the one was
turned sideways with respect to the other. In the NSI scenes, the
two agents were either side-by-side or the one was turned sideways
with respect to the other. They were never presented moving face-
to-face in the NSI scenes in order to rule out the possibility that
their actions might be mistakenly perceived as social interactions.
Prior to the fMRI experiment, a behavioral study (pre-fMRI
study) was performed to test the relevance of the stimuli described
above by evaluating the recognition accuracy. Subjects were asked
to classify the stimuli as NSI or SI. Any ambiguous stimuli were
eliminated on the basis of the error rate, i.e., more than 20% made
by the group. A resulting set of 112 stimuli was used for the fMRI
experiment. The 56 SI displays and the 56 NSI displays were
equally divided into 4 runs. An additional set of 28 stimuli was
used during the practice session, which was carried out prior to
scanning the subjects.
fMRI task and procedure
The experiment had an event-related design composed of the
two conditions SI and NSI. A scheme of the procedure is given in
Fig. 2. Following a fixation cross, each scene was shown for 3 s in
random order. Subjects were asked to watch the displays carefully
and to categorize them. An instruction sequence, consisting of a
plain green rectangle and a red rectangle divided into two parts,
appeared for 3 s thereafter. The plain green rectangle symbolized
the two persons acting together, and the red rectangle divided into
two parts stood for the two persons moving independently. Each
rectangle could appear on the right or left side of the screen, at
random in order to avoid anticipatory responses and to maintain
the attention of the subject constant. The subject’s right hand was
placed above a response pad with the index finger placed above
the left button and the middle finger above the right button. The
participants had to answer the question ‘‘Are the two persons
acting together or separately?’’ by pressing the button on the side
where the rectangle they chose was presented. For instance, if they
thought the two persons were acting together and the green
rectangle was presented on the left side of the screen, they had to
press the left button. During the inter stimulus interval (which
Figure 1. Point-light displays showing social interactions (A)
and no social interactions (B). The example of SI depicts an actor
showing something on the ground to another actor, who responds by
coming closer. The example of NSI depicts one actor raising a leg and
the second one jumping. In this illustration, in order to help to
distinguish the human form, the dots have been linked by full lines.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015749.g001
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again.
The stimuli were back projected onto a frosted screen
positioned at the back end of the MRI tunnel and viewed by the
subjects through a mirror. Stimuli were presented and responses
recorded using a software program based on the LabVIEW 7.1
development system. Before scanning, participants were first
instructed and trained to classify the two types of displays. A
debriefing session was run immediately after each experiment to
ensure that the participants had encountered no difficulties while
performing the task in the scanner.
fMRI data acquisition
Images were acquired on a 3-T MEDSPEC 30/80 AVANCE
whole-body imager (Bruker, Ettlingen, Germany) equipped with a
circular polarized head coil. Participants were lying comfortably in
the supine position in the MR scanner. An ergonomic MR
compatible response pad was placed under the subject’s right hand.
Headphones were provided to dampen the scanner noise and to be
able to communicate with the subject. Anatomical MRI data were
acquired using high-resolution structural T1-weighted image
(inversion–recovery sequence, resolution 160.89861.422 mm) in
the sagittal plane, covering the whole brain. For functional imaging,
a T2*-weightedecho planarsequencecoveringthewholebrainwith
32 interleaved 3-mm-thick/1 mm-gap axial slices (repetition time
=2133.3 ms, echo time =30.0 ms, flip angle =79.5u, FOV
=192 mm, 64664 matrix of 36364 mm voxels) was used. Four
runs, each including 14 different SI and 14 different NSI, were
conducted with each subject. At each run, lasting 4 mn50 s, 137
functional volumes were acquired. The whole experiment lasted for
about forty minutes.
Data were processed and analyzed using SPM2 (Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology,
London; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first six function-
al volumes acquired in each runwere discarded to ensure that
longitudinal relaxation time equilibration was achieved. The
remaining 131 images were corrected for differences in slice
acquisition time. A slice acquired half-way was chosen as reference
in order to correct for temporal differences between the first and
last slices. All volumes were realigned to the first volume to correct
for head movements between scans. The functional images were
then co-registered to each individual anatomical T1-weighted
image and spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) standard space. Data were then spatially smoothed
using an 8 mm full-width at half-maximum isotropic Gaussian
kernel to accommodate for inter-subject differences in anatomy.
Statistical analysis
Given the high success rates obtained in recognizing both SI
and NSI (more than 95% of the responses were correct, see Results
section) and the lack of significant differences, we pooled accurate
and inaccurate answers in our statistical model. The statistical
analysis of the pre-processed BOLD signals was performed using a
generalized linear model (GLM) approach. Three regressors were
modeled using a 3 s box-car waveform convolved with the
canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). Two regressors
(SI and NSI conditions) were considered as events of interest while
the regressor modeling the subject’s answer was considered as an
event of no interest. Since we were interested in the social
components of human motion, and as the NSI condition was
considered as the control condition, only statistical images
corresponding to the (SI -NSI) contrast were computed.
To account for inter-subject variability in the group analysis, the
contrast images obtained at level 1 were included in a second level
t-test, to create an SPM map. A one-sample t-test was used. All the
fMRI statistics and p values were based on group random-effect
analyses. The false-discovery-rate (FDR) [38] threshold of p,0.05
was adopted to deal with the problem of multiple comparisons by
automatically defining a statistical significance threshold ensuring
that the average rate of false positives among the voxels activated
would be less than p. Activated brain regions were defined as
clusters consisting of more than 10 contiguous voxels. The
Figure 2. Sequence of trial presentation across time. The training sequence contained a plain green rectangle (shown in grey in the figure) and
a red rectangle (in white here) divided into two parts. The plain green rectangle symbolized the two persons acting together; and the red rectangle
divided in two parts stood for the two agents moving independently.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015749.g002
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atlas of Duvernoy [39], according to the major sulci and gyri
distinguishable on a representative normalized anatomical MRI of
one subject.
Behavioral data
Subjects’ performances (whether they opted accurately between
SI and NSI) were rated in terms of the percentage of accurate
responses obtained in each condition. Comparisons were per-
formed using the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Since
performances could be in the 0 to 100 range, we used a z
transform to convert the values into an unbiased Gaussian
distribution.
Results
Behavioral performances
The average percentages of correct answers were: SI =96.7%
(SD =3.8) and NSI =99.0 (SD =1.3). Statistical analyses did not
show any difference between the two conditions (W=43 with
p=0.092). Since they were not significantly different, the two
conditions could be taken to be equally easy.
Brain activations: Social interaction (SI) versus No social
interaction (NSI)
The main effect of watching animations depicting social
interactions (SI) in contrast to animations without social interactions
(NSI)elicitedsignificantpatternsofactivation,asshowninFig.3and
listed in Table 1.
Temporal activations were detected bilaterally in the posterior
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and the right anterior superior
temporal sulcus (aSTS). We also observed activations in the left
TPJ. The right inferior temporal gyrus and right middle temporal
gyrus also showed changes in activity. Frontal activations included
the left dorsal part of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the
orbitofrontal cortices (OFC). Increased levels of activity were also
observed in the fronto-parietal regions: activation occurred in the
inferior frontal gyri (IFG) (pars triangularis and pars opercularis) and
the premotor areas (PM), and the parietal activation included the
right superior parietal gyrus (SPG) and the bilateral intraparietal
sulci (IaPS). In the medial wall, activations were also observed
bilaterally in the supplementary motor areas (SMA). More
unexpectedly, activity was also elicited in the caudate nuclei
within the basal ganglia.
Discussion
The experimental procedure used in the present study made it
possible to specifically isolate the social content carried by whole-
body movements. Watching two agents engaged in a social
interaction, as compared to observing non-social movements
performed by the same agents, enhanced the recruitment of a
region classically engaged in the processing of whole-body human
motion (the pSTS), of structures belonging to the mentalizing
network (the left TPJ, the right aSTS and the dorsal part of the
MPFC), and of areas belonging to the action observation/
execution matching network (the IFG, PM and IaPS bilaterally
and the right SPG). Interestingly, we found the mentalizing
network and the mirror network concomittantly activated while
grasping the meaning of social intentions carried out by whole-
body motions.
Despite a minimalistic presentation, the observers were able to
determine whether or not the scene depicted a social interaction;
perceiving social information such as emotion or intention is
related directly to the movement kinematics [10,40,41]. Recently,
the analysis of the kinematics of a gesture as simple as reaching
towards an object and grasping it has shown differences in whether
the gesture was associated with an intent to communicate or not
[40]. In a previous study designed to categorize various types of
human motion, non social human actions such as walking or
climbing stairs were recognized more accurately than social
actions such as greeting another person and dancing [4].
On the contrary, non-ambiguous stimuli were selected from the
preliminary pre-fMRI study in the two conditions. The perfor-
mance analysis confirmed that both were equally easy to
categorize. The possibility can therefore be ruled out that the
difficulty of the task may have been a confounder explaining some
of the differences in brain activations. Lastly, greater arousal
towards the social interaction condition, which presents with more
interesting, salient and therefore endogeneously attracting fea-
tures, might induce increased activity in regions involved in
sustained attention expressed by increased saccades, such as the
Frontal Eye Field (FEF) [42]. Indeed, eye movements reflected by
FEF activity are made to orient our gaze and attention in order to
provide salient cues to our on-going behavior [43]. A careful
examination of the dorsolateral prefrontal activities indicated that
these were outside the FEF. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude that
some of the increased brain activations found when observing
social interactions might reflect other additional attention
processes.
Greater recruitment of the pSTS classically processing
whole-body point-light displays
One important point raised by our study is that observing
whole-body human motion in a social context (emotional or not)
activated the pSTS more than watching simple body movements.
Besides its role in human motion processing [13,15,44], the pSTS
Figure 3. fMRI results from random-effects analyses: social
interaction . non social interaction. Significant activations (p,0.05,
corrected) in the whole-brain random effects analysis during the
observation of social interaction displays (SI) versus non social
interaction displays (NSI). Group activations are projected onto the
normalized anatomical brain of one of the participants. pSTS = superior
temporal sulcus (posterior part), TPJ = temporo-parietal junction, IFG
= inferior frontal gyrus, PM = premotor cortex, aSTS = superior
temporal sulcus (anterior part), dMPFC = medial prefrontal cortex
(dorsal part), IaPS= intraparietal sulcus, R/L= right and left hemi-
spheres.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015749.g003
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animacy and interactivity. It contributes to detecting whether or not
a moving abstract shape is an animate being [45], and it participates
inthespontaneous perception ofanimacycreated bytwointeractive
moving objects [46]. Both animacy (animated entities) and
interactivity (interacting objects) are required for the attribution of
agency, which has been defined as intentional contingencies
between agents [47]. Detecting agency is crucial to distinguish the
role of each of the interacting agents, and thus to grasp the
significance of the social scene. It seems likely that the increased
activity detected in the pSTS when subjects were viewing human
motion depicting social interactions resulted from this process.
Regions belonging to the mentalizing network
contribute to attributing social meaning
Stronger activations were detected in the left TPJ, the right aSTS
and the dorsal part of the MPFC when viewing the social scenes as
compared to the non-social ones. These brain regions are generally
attributed to mentalizing processes. Here we try to define more
precisely their role in the understanding of a social interaction
between two agents.
The TPJ region is thought to be involved in the computation of
various spatial perspectives between the self and others, such as
perspective taking [48], which makes it a good candidate brain
region for mindreading. However, although some authors have
stressed the role of the right TPJ in the attribution of mental states
[49], we clearly observed the occurrence of a left hemispheric TPJ
activation in the social condition. This is in line with the increased
activation of the left TPJ detected by Ciaramidaro et al. [50] while
subjects observed static images depicting ‘‘communicative inten-
tions’’, a condition which was fairly similar to our own social
condition. The latter authors suggested that the right TPJ seems to
be necessary for understanding ‘‘private intentions’’, whereas the
left TPJ may be specifically involved in understanding social
intentions [50].
We also found strong bilateral activations in the dorsal MPFC,
classicaly associated with tasks requiring thinking about oneself or
others, and especially with judgments about people who are
dissimilar to oneself [32]. Both studies using static cartoons
describing communicative intentions have shown that the MPFC
is involved in the processing of social interactions [50,51], and
video clips depicting social interactions activate the dorsal part of
the MPFC [52]. Added to these previous findings, our study
suggests that regardless of the amount of information provided by
visual stimuli (realistic dynamic or static features, or minimalistic
human shapes as in this study) the dorsal MPFC plays a major role
in understanding social interactions.
Table 1. Brain areas showing increased activity in response to the social interaction condition.
Side Brain regions MNI coordinates Brodmann area t value Cluster size
XYZ
L Medial prefrontal cortex, dorsal part 23 54 27 BA9/10 8.91 73
R Lateral orbitofrontal gyrus 24 15 218 BA11/47 7.29 27
L Lateral orbitofrontal gyrus 239 24 215 BA11/47 4.96 40
L Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis 251 30 12 BA45/46 7.14 189
L Inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis 245 3 18 BA44/45 5.57
R Inferior frontal gyrus, pars triangularis 54 27 9 BA45/46 6.74 67
R Medial supplementary motor area 3 12 54 BA6 5.71 59
L Medial supplementary motor area 29 21 57 BA6 4.17
L Premotor cortex, dorsal part 230 0 57 BA6 5.42 14
L Premotor cortex, ventral part 245 23 54 BA6 4.62 15
R Premotor cortex, ventral part 45 12 42 BA6 4.67 13
R Superior parietal gyrus 24 260 63 BA7 6.43 88
R Intraparietal sulcus 24 251 57 BA7/40 4.72
L Intraparietal sulcus 242 248 54 BA7/40 6.43 30
R Superior temporal sulcus, posterior part 42 272 18 BA39 5.42 42
L Temporo-parietal junction 251 251 21 BA39 5.81 134
L Superior temporal sulcus, posterior part 248 263 12 BA21/22 5.12
R Superior temporal sulcus, anterior part 51 23 221 BA21/22 5.52 35
R Inferior temporal gyrus 57 236 218 BA21 5.24 18
R Fusiform gyrus 45 242 221 BA21 4.42
R Middle temporal gyrus 54 254 0 BA19/37 4.27 18
R Caudate nucleus 9 18 0 7.31 54
L Caudate nucleus 29 9 6 5.99 151
L Ventral anterior thalamus nucleus 23 29 0 5.81
Peak voxel and cluster size that were significantly activated in the whole-brain random effects group analysis during the observation of social interaction displays versus
non social interaction displays. t values reflect the statistical difference between the 2 conditions. The activations presented survived to correction for multiple
comparisons (FDR) across the whole brain at p,0.05. Only activations in excess of 10 voxels are listed. L/R: left and right hemispheres.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015749.t001
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watching social interactions
As compared to non social stimuli, social scenes elicited an
increased level of activation in a fronto-parietal network including
the IaPS, the PM areas and the IFG as part of the mirror system.
We hypothesized the recruitment of the mirror system to be
enhanced during the social scenes because they call for more
complex action representations than meaningless movements. The
build-up of action representations is a slow process that takes place
during the entire childhood [53] and might be impaired in
neurodevelopmental pathologies presenting with social deficits,
such as autism spectrum disorders [54]. Likewise, the repertoire of
social representations is fed by motor and social experience, raising
it to a complex representational system in adults. It is therefore not
surprising that the involvement of the mirror system translates the
complexity of these representations.
Recently, activity within the rostral SMA (rSMA) has been
associated with the action observation/execution matching
network [55,56]. The rSMA is not classically thought to be part
of the mirroring system, but we also found it to be strongly co-
activated with the fronto-parietal network, which supports the idea
that this structure is involved in motor simulation. Observing
grasping actions which intentions depend on the context [57] and
observing actions with incongruent intentions elicit greater
activations of the IFG [58]. The IaPS plays a pivotal role in
intentional processes by translating encoded information into
action [59]. Therefore, the mirroring system does not only provide
an action recognition mechanism, but also constitutes a neural
system for coding the intentional actions of others. The IaPS might
also perform specific functions relating to non-verbal communi-
cation. Interestingly, the IaPS is selectively recruited by the
processing of meaningful upper limb movements [60]. Therefore,
the strong bilateral IaPS activation triggered when sujects are
watching two characters engaged in a social interaction might also
reflect a higher gesture processing, which contributes importantly
to understanding social intentions.
The motor simulation theory in social cognition
According to the motor simulation theory, people understand
each other’s actions by mapping the movements they see onto
their own action representations [23,25–28]. Our findings stress
the role of motor simulation in understanding social intentions i.e.
intentions directed towards a conspecific who acts back. Although
it has been clearly established that understanding others’ social
intentions calls on brain regions which are partly associated with
the mentalizing network, the contribution of motor resonance by
means of the activation of the action observation/execution
matching network (i.e. mirror system) is still a controversial issue.
Some authors have claimed that the recognition of social
intentions is an inferential or deductive process which activates
regions belonging to the mentalizing network, which are located
well outside the motor system [2,29–30,61]; whereas for others the
ability to understand social intentions may be subtended by the
mirror system [32,62–66]. Recent experimental studies have
pointed out that the mirror system may play a complementary role
in the understanding of intentional actions [58,67,68] and during
joint actions [69,70]. A computational framework has been
developed to explain how this system might provide the basis for
reading the mental states of other people during action observation
[71]. We provide here experimental evidence supporting the
involvement of the mirror system in the understanding of social
intentions between two interacting agents.
The mirror and mentalizing networks concurrently active
While the mirror and mentalizing networks are rarely
concurrently active [72], we found that, under specific conditions,
both of them might be needed to catch the social intentions carried
by whole-body motion. In the absence of biological motions the
mirror system might not aid the mentalizing system in detecting
intentionality [72]. While our experimental design enabled to
subtract whole-body motion per se (SI condition versus NSI
condition), we still found the mirror system activated, therefore
underlining its contribution to social understanding. On the
contrary, only the mentalizing network, but not the mirror system,
was found active when participants were explicitly instructed to
deliberate on the intentions of observed actors [58] or when they
saw actions with unusual goal [29]. We demonstrated here that the
mentalizing network and the mirror system might both be
activated by high levels of goal i.e. social intentions. Co-activations
of the mirror and mentalizing networks strongly support the
hypothesis that they share a common functional core in social
cognition. The precise interactions between these two brain
networks and their development during childhood remain an open
question which is of immense value for our understanding of social
cognition.
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